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Food Trends
Grain Production Drops
Meat Production and Consumption Grow
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In 2002, global grain production declined for
the third time in four years, due mainly to
drought in North America and Australia.1 At
1,833 million tons, the harvest was 3 percent
lower than the previous year’s and was the
smallest crop since 1995.2 (See Figure 1.)
World grain production has more than dou-
bled since 1961, mainly due to farmers harvest-
ing more grain from each hectare,
since farmers are planting grain on
only slightly more land today—671
million hectares in 2002 compared with 648 mil-
lion in 1967.3 The average harvest of grain from
a given hectare has more than doubled world-
wide, from 1.24 tons in 1961 to 2.82 tons in 2002.4
Still, production of the three major cereal
crops declined in 2002. Global wheat production
dropped to 562 million tons, down 3 percent;
production of corn stood at 598 million tons,
nearly 2 percent lower; and rice production, at
391 million tons, was 2 percent below output in
2001.5 These three grains account for 85 percent
of the world’s grain harvest.6
Global grain production is concentrated geo-
graphically. China, India, and the United States
alone account for 46 percent of global produc-
tion. Europe, including the former Soviet states,
grows another 21 percent.7
Of the world’s major grain-producing
regions, production across Asia was up, in
Europe it was stagnant, and in the North Amer-
ican wheat and corn belts the harvest suffered
from drought and high summer temperatures.8
A weak and irregular monsoon reduced rice
harvests in India and, to a lesser degree, in
China—the world’s second largest and top rice
producers, respectively. The wheat harvest
declined slightly in China (the world’s largest
producer) but was up in India (the second
largest producer).9
In the United States, responsible for at least
one third of the global corn harvest, a severe
drought across the middle of the country cut
production by 8 percent.10 And the U.S. wheat
harvest was down by 14 percent—also due to
drought.11 In Australia, severe drought reduced
the grain harvest by almost 40 percent.12
Despite a shift toward more meat eating and
greater dietary diversity around the world, peo-
ple still primarily eat foods made from grain.
On average, they get about 48 percent of their
calories from grains, a share that has declined
just slightly from 50 percent over the last four
decades.13 Grains, particularly corn, also form
the primary feedstock for industrial livestock
production.
Global grain production per person dropped
to 294 kilograms in 2002, the lowest level since
1970.14 (See Figure 2.) But output per person
varies dramatically by region. For instance, it
stands at roughly 1,046 kilograms in North
America, most of which is fed to livestock,
compared with 316 kilograms in China and just
120 kilograms in sub-Saharan Africa.15
While the downward slide in the global out-
put per person could eventually prove problem-
atic for food supplies, the focus on this number
can be misleading, since people are hungry pri-
marily because they are too poor to purchase
food, not because of an outright scarcity of food.
The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization
estimates that there are at least 815 million
chronically hungry people in the world, a modest
decline from the 956 million estimated in 1970.16
Most of these hungry people are concentra-
ted in India and Asia, although the most acute
increase in hunger in 2002 was in sub-Saharan
Africa, where roughly 40 million people are 
in immediate need of food aid.17 Following 
two consecutive years of poor grain harvests—
exacerbated by drought, civil conflict, and
HIV/AIDS—grain and flour prices in the region
have increased beyond the reach of much of the
population, and both imports and international
relief have been insufficient to stem the rise.18
Global grain production exceeded con-
sumption between 1996 and 1998, but the har-
vest has slipped below demand for the last four
years, pushing down the stocks of grain held in
private and government stores.19 World cereal
stocks fell sharply, to some 466 million tons,
by the end of 2002—nearly a 20-percent reduc-
tion in just one year and the lowest level in 40
years of recordkeeping.20 The ratio of grain
stocks to annual use also hit an all-time low.21
(See Figure 3.)
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Grain Production Drops
World Grain Production,
1961–2002
Year Total Per Person
(million tons) (kilograms)
1961 805 261
1962 858 274
1963 867 270
1964 914 279
1965 914 273
1966 992 290
1967 1032 296
1968 1065 299
1969 1073 295
1970 1087 293
1971 1194 315
1972 1156 299
1973 1246 316
1974 1216 303
1975 1241 304
1976 1348 324
1977 1333 315
1978 1454 338
1979 1413 323
1980 1418 318
1981 1496 330
1982 1552 337
1983 1478 315
1984 1632 342
1985 1665 343
1986 1678 340
1987 1618 322
1988 1565 307
1989 1700 328
1990 1779 337
1991 1717 320
1992 1797 330
1993 1726 313
1994 1777 317
1995 1714 302
1996 1882 326
1997 1902 325
1998 1903 321
1999 1890 315
2000 1863 307
2001 1894 308
2002 (prel) 1833 294
Source: U.N. Food and Agriculture 
Organization.
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Figure 2: World Grain Production Per Person, 1961–2002
Figure 1: World Grain Production, 1961–2002
Figure 3: World Grain Stock-to-Use Ratio, 1961–2002
The world’s appetite for meat continues to grow,
with 242 million tons produced in 2002—an
increase of 2.5 percent from 2001.1 (See Figure
1.) Meat production has doubled since 1977,
and over the last half-century it has increased
fivefold.2 Production of beef, poultry, pork, and
other meats has risen to nearly 40 kilograms
per person, more than twice as much as was
available in 1950.3 (See Figure 2.)
Consumers in industrial nations eat more
than 80 kilograms of meat per person, most of
it from pork and poultry, compared with just 28
kilograms for people in developing countries.4
In fact, people in industrial nations eat three to
four times as much meat as people living in
developing countries.5
Yet two thirds of the gains in meat consump-
tion in 2002 occurred in developing countries,
where urbanization, rising incomes,
and the globalization of trade are
changing diets and increasing per
capita consumption of meat.6 And as develop-
ing countries climb up the “protein ladder,”
they have overtaken industrial nations as meat
producers by accounting for 56 percent of pro-
duction—an increase of 5 percent since 1995.7
Pork production reached over 93 million
tons in 2002, followed by poultry production
(72 million tons), and beef (60 million tons).8
Other types of meat, including sheep and goat
meat, accounted for 16 million tons of the total
output.9 (See Figure 3.)
Pigs dominate meat production and con-
sumption in China—half of the world’s pigs are
raised and eaten there.10 The United States pro-
duces and consumes the most poultry in the
world, and Brazil is the world’s largest producer
of beef and its second-largest consumer, behind
only the United States.11
Since the early 1960s, the number of
livestock has increased 60 percent, from 3 billion
to more than 5 billion, and the number of fowl
has quadrupled from 4 billion to 16 billion.12
Industrial feedlots are the most rapidly growing
production system for these animals, producing
43 percent of the world’s beef and more than
half of the world’s pork and poultry.13 These
“factory farms” are also responsible for huge
amounts of manure and air pollution and 
for the overuse of antibiotics as crowded condi-
tions encourage the rapid spread of disease.
Producing meat requires large amounts of
grain—most of the corn and soybeans har-
vested in the world are used to fatten live-
stock.14 Producing 1 calorie of flesh (beef,
pork, or chicken) requires 11–17 calories of
feed. So a meat eater’s diet requires two to four
times more land than a vegetarian’s diet.15
Soybeans, wheat, rice, and corn also produce
three to eight times as much protein as meat.16
The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion predicts that meat production will grow 
to more than 300 million tons by 2020.17
Environmental and health concerns could be a
constraint on that, however. Manure from hog
factories, chicken houses, and feedlots for cat-
tle can contaminate groundwater and rivers
and can pollute the air.18 Cattle also contribute
to climate change by emitting methane gas,
and overgrazing has decimated once fertile 
and productive grasslands from Africa to Latin
America.19
Meat recalls, foot-and-mouth disease, and
mad cow disease (BSE—bovine spongiform
encephalopathy) have increased concerns
about the safety of eating meat. During the
summer of 2002, millions of pounds of con-
taminated beef and other meat products were
recalled by the U.S. government.20 In Japan,
beef consumption has been declining since the
first case of BSE was reported there in 2001.21
Concerns over drug residues in poultry led to
market closures for U.S.-produced chicken in
the Russian Federation.22
In the United States, high rates of obesity,
heart disease, cancer, and other diseases associ-
ated with high-fat, high-cholesterol diets have
led some people to shun red meat in favor of
chicken and others to give up meat entirely.
The popularity of grass-fed and organic meats 
is also rising as consumers realize the high
health and environmental costs of meat raised
in factory farms.23
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Meat Production and Consumption Grow
World Meat Production,
1950–2002
Year Total Per Person
(million tons) (kilograms)
1950 44 17.2
1955 58 20.7
1960 64 21.0
1965 84 25.2
1970 100 27.1
1971 105 27.6
1972 108 27.8
1973 108 27.5
1974 114 28.3
1975 116 28.3
1976 118 28.5
1977 122 28.9
1978 127 29.6
1979 133 30.2
1980 137 30.6
1981 139 30.7
1982 140 30.4
1983 145 30.9
1984 149 31.2
1985 154 31.8
1986 160 32.3
1987 165 32.8
1988 171 33.5
1989 174 33.4
1990 180 34.0
1991 184 34.3
1992 187 34.4
1993 192 34.8
1994 199 35.4
1995 205 36.0
1996 207 35.8
1997 215 36.8
1998 223 37.6
1999 229 38.1
2000 232 38.2
2001 237 38.6
2002 (prel) 242 39.0
Source: U.N. Food and Agriculture 
Organization.
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Figure 2: World Meat Production Per Person, 1950–2002
Figure 1: World Meat Production, 1950–2002
Figure 3: World Meat Production by Source, 2002
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Energy and Atmosphere Trends
Fossil Fuel Use Up
Nuclear Power Rises
Wind Power’s Rapid Growth Continues
Carbon Emissions and Temperature Climb
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The global use of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and nat-
ural gas) increased by 1.3 percent in 2002, to
8,034 million tons of oil equivalent, according
to preliminary estimates based on government
and industry sources.1 (See Figure 1.) This
compares with a 0.3-percent rise in 2001.2 Fos-
sil fuel consumption was 4.7 times the level in
1950, and it now accounts for 77 percent of
world energy use.3
Global oil use rose by just 0.5 percent in
2002, due in part to a sluggish global economy,
according to International Energy
Agency (IEA) early estimates.4 (See Fig-
ure 2.) The United States, which uses
about 26 percent of global oil, saw only a slight
increase in demand.5 And oil use fell in Europe
by an estimated 0.7 percent.6 It also declined by
0.6 percent (combined average) in Japan, South
Korea, Australia, and New Zealand and by 2.6
percent in Latin America.7 Growth was
strongest in China, where demand was up 5.7
percent, followed by the Middle East (2.5 per-
cent) and the former Soviet bloc (1.9 percent).8
After a brief but steep decline in the late
1990s, coal use is again on the rise. In 2002,
global coal consumption was an estimated 2,298
million tons of oil equivalent—1.9 percent
above the 2001 figure.9 In the United States,
which uses nearly 25 percent of the world’s coal,
demand fell by about 0.5 percent.10 But China,
accounting for 23 percent of global coal use, saw
an increase of around 4.9 percent—a sharp
rebound following declines in the late 1990s.11
While China has banned coal burning in some
regions with smog and acid rain problems, out-
put from state mines has increased recently.12
Natural gas consumption grew by 2 percent,
to 2,207 million tons of oil equivalent.13 The
United States, which consumes about 27
percent of the world’s natural gas, used 3.7 per-
cent less during the first 10 months of 2002
compared with the same period in 2001.14 The
decline was due primarily to mild winter
weather early in the year. Among industrial
nations as a whole, natural gas use fell 2.4 per-
cent through November, with the greatest drop
in Japan (down 10.4 percent) and the highest
increase in Norway (up 81 percent).15
Globally, however, natural gas has become
the fastest growing of the fossil fuels, and repre-
sents an increasing share of global energy use.
Today natural gas accounts for nearly 24
percent of world energy consumption, compared
with 22.5 percent a decade ago.16 The increase
is due to a number of factors, including an
abundance of gas supplies in many countries
and the lower environmental impacts of gas use
compared with the other fossil fuels.17 Much of
the recent rise in gas use and the projected
future increase result from efforts to reduce
emissions of air pollutants—primarily through
switching from coal and oil to gas in power
plants.18
In the short term, major uncertainties remain
in assessing future trends for fossil fuel use,
including the potential economic and political
consequences of turmoil in the Middle East. The
return of El Niño in late 2002 and early 2003
will likely alter rainfall patterns and bring more
extreme temperatures, affecting hydropower
production and natural gas demand as weather
patterns shift.
For the longer term, the International
Energy Agency projects that global primary
energy demand will increase 1.7 percent annu-
ally between 2000 and 2030, reaching 15,300
million tons of oil equivalent in 2030.19 Fossil
fuels are expected to meet more than 90 percent
of the increased demand, with most of this
growth occurring in the developing world.20
But even with this rapid growth, the IEA proj-
ects that 18 percent of the people in the world
in 2030 will still lack access to modern energy
services such as electricity.21
Yet the IEA forecast is based on assumptions
that are tenuous at best. It assumes that prices
for most fuels will remain virtually unchanged
through 2010 and that energy taxes will not 
be modified. It also assumes that global oil pro-
duction will continue to rise, despite the fact
that many analysts project it will peak prior to
2020.22 While oil consumption is likely to be
limited by geological and political constraints,
combustion of coal will probably be limited by
its associated health and environmental costs,
particularly global climate change.
Fossil Fuel Use Up Janet L. Sawin
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Fossil Fuel Use Up
World Fossil Fuel
Consumption, 1950–2002
Natural
Year Coal Oil Gas
(million tons of oil equivalent)
1950 1,074 470 171
1955 1,270 694 266
1960 1,544 951 416
1965 1,486 1,530 632
1970 1,553 2,254 924
1971 1,538 2,377 988
1972 1,540 2,556 1,032
1973 1,579 2,754 1,059
1974 1,592 2,710 1,082
1975 1,613 2,678 1,075
1976 1,681 2,852 1,138
1977 1,726 2,944 1,169
1978 1,744 3,055 1,216
1979 1,834 3,103 1,295
1980 1,814 2,972 1,304
1981 1,826 2,868 1,318
1982 1,863 2,776 1,322
1983 1,914 2,761 1,340
1984 2,011 2,809 1,451
1985 2,107 2,801 1,493
1986 2,143 2,893 1,504
1987 2,211 2,949 1,583
1988 2,261 3,039 1,663
1989 2,293 3,088 1,738
1990 2,270 3,136 1,774
1991 2,218 3,138 1,806
1992 2,204 3,170 1,810
1993 2,200 3,141 1,849
1994 2,219 3,200 1,858
1995 2,255 3,247 1,914
1996 2,336 3,323 2,004
1997 2,324 3,396 1,992
1998 2,280 3,410 2,017
1999 2,163 3,481 2,069
2000 2,217 3,519 2,158
2001 2,255 3,511 2,164
2002 (prel) 2,298 3,529 2,207
Source: Worldwatch estimates based on BP,
DOE, IEA, IGU, and LBL.
Million Tons of Oil Equivalent
Source: LBL, DOE, IGU, IEA, BP
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
Million Tons of Oil Equivalent
Oil
Coal
Natural Gas
Source: LBL, DOE, IGU, IEA, BP
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Figure 2: World Fossil Fuel Consumption by Source,
1950–2002
Figure 1: World Fossil Fuel Consumption, 1950–2002
Between 2001 and 2002, total installed nuclear
power generating capacity increased by more
than 5,000 megawatts (nearly 1.5 percent), the
fastest percentage growth for the industry since
1993.1 (See Figure 1.) Seven new reactors were
grid-connected in 2002—four in China, two in
South Korea, and one in the Czech Republic—
bringing the world’s total to 437.2 Additional
capacity increases in 2002 came from squeezing
more power from existing reactors.
In 2002, construction started on six new
reactors, all in India.3 (See Figure 2.) Some 25
reactors remain under active construction (with
a combined capacity of 20,959 megawatts), the
fewest since the 1960s.4 And seven reactors
were permanently closed, bringing the total
number of retired reactors to 106 (representing
31,439 megawatts).5 (See Figure 3.)
China expects to complete construction on
another four reactors in the next few years,
with plans to quadruple existing capacity to
20,000 megawatts by 2020.6 Likewise, India’s
recent surge in new construction will increase
the country’s nuclear generating capacity by
nearly 150 percent, to 6,000 megawatts. India’s
goal for 2020 is also 20,000 megawatts of
nuclear capacity.7
In some traditional markets, however,
nuclear power is facing tougher times. The pri-
vatized English nuclear company, British
Energy, was saved from receivership last year by
a government bailout.8 Nuclear power simply
proved too costly for the competitive U.K. elec-
tricity market. The company moved to sell its
stakes in U.S. and Canadian nuclear energy
companies, perhaps frustrating efforts to restart
two mothballed reactors in Canada.9
Belgium’s government furthered its effort to
phase out nuclear power by 2025 with a parlia-
mentary vote of approval.10 The Finnish parlia-
ment, in contrast, narrowly voted in favor of
building the country’s fifth reactor.11 Still, not a
single new reactor is under construction in
Western Europe.
In Eastern Europe, Romania moved closer to
obtaining financing to restart construction on its
second reactor, which began in 1982.12 Russia
continues to have two reactors under construc-
tion, but Ukraine made little progress in obtain-
ing resources to restart mothballed projects.13
In the United States, the biggest owner of
nuclear power, Exelon Corp., dropped out of an
international consortium to develop a new,
smaller power plant.14 Despite press reports
that utilities planned to build new reactors, no
serious movement in that direction occurred as
the U.S. electric industry reeled from financial
losses, scandals, and generation overcapacity.15
Japan’s nuclear industry suffered “the most
serious setback ever in public trust in the coun-
try’s nuclear power program” in 2002: it was
disclosed that the country’s largest utility and
nuclear operator, Tokyo Electric (Tepco), had
been systematically falsifying safety inspections
since the late 1980s.16 As government
regulators scrambled to close Tepco’s reactors,
the scandal spread to other utilities, where sim-
ilar falsification became evident.17
The cover-up had immediate consequences
for Japan’s industry, which only has three reactors
under construction. The governor of Fukui with-
drew permission to build two new reactors in his
province, and two other governors rescinded
their consent to load mixed plutonium/uranium
fuel in existing reactors as planned.18
South Korea completed two more reactors in
2002, leaving just two under construction there
at year’s end. But the country anticipates com-
pleting eight more reactors in the next 11 years.19
Concerns over the proliferation of nuclear
weapons rose significantly in 2002, colliding
with plans to build nuclear power reactors in
both Iran and North Korea. The United States
accused Iran of working on nuclear weapons,
although it failed to convince Russia to stop
helping Iran finish at least two reactors.20 Iran
says it is preparing for 6,000 megawatts of new
power reactors.21
Meanwhile, the fate of two reactors to be
built in North Korea was unclear after the
country admitted having a secret nuclear
weapons program.22 The reactors, first
promised in 1994 by South Korea, Japan, and
the United States in exchange for ending a
weapons program, were in the early stages of
construction as of late 2002.
Nuclear Power Rises Nicholas Lenssen
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Nuclear Power Rises
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World Net Installed Electrical
Generating Capacity of Nuclear
Power Plants, 1960–2002
Year Capacity
(gigawatts)
1960 1
1965 5
1970 16
1971 24
1972 32
1973 45
1974 61
1975 71
1976 85
1977 99
1978 114
1979 121
1980 135
1981 155
1982 170
1983 189
1984 219
1985 250
1986 276
1987 297
1988 310
1989 320
1990 328
1991 325
1992 327
1993 336
1994 338
1995 340
1996 343
1997 343
1998 343
1999 346
2000 349
2001 352
2002 (prel) 357
Source: Worldwatch Institute database, 
compiled from the IAEA and press reports.
Figure 2: World Nuclear Reactor Construction Starts,
1960–2002
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Figure 3: Nuclear Capacity of Decommisioned Plants,
1964–2002
Figure 1: World Electrical Generating Capacity of
Nuclear Power Plants, 1960–2002
Wind Power’s Rapid Growth Continues Janet L. Sawin
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Wind energy generating capacity reached 
nearly 32,000 megawatts by the end of 2002, an
increase of 27 percent over 2001.1 (See Figure
1.) Spurred on by falling costs, concern about
climate change, and new government policies,
wind remains the fastest-growing energy source
in the world. Global wind capacity has
tripled since 1998.2 In early 2002, wind
power provided enough electricity to
meet the residential electricity needs of 35 mil-
lion people worldwide.3 Many more people get
at least some of their electricity from the wind.
Global capacity net additions in 2002 totaled
approximately 6,720 megawatts—a new record.4
(See Figure 2.) Yet the rate of growth was 
slower than expected due to a slump in the U.S.
market, which continues to swing widely in
response to short-term extensions of a federal
wind energy tax credit. The United States
installed only 410 megawatts of new capacity in
2002, compared with 1,714 megawatts in 2001,
bringing its total to 4,685 megawatts.5 But up 
to 1,800 more megawatts are expected in 2003
as developers rush to install projects before the
tax credit expires at year’s end.6
Europe installed an estimated 5,870 mega-
watts of capacity in 2002, 31 percent more than
in 2001.7 Europe has nearly 73 percent of
global wind capacity—thanks to strong, consis-
tent policies driving demand for renewable
energy technologies, particularly in Germany,
Spain, and Denmark, which accounted for 90
percent of the capacity installed in Europe dur-
ing 2002.8
In fact, more than half of Europe’s and 38
percent of the world’s wind capacity is found 
in Germany.9 In 2002, Germany set another
record, adding 3,250 megawatts to end the 
year with just over 12,000 megawatts of total
capacity—enough to provide 4.7 percent of the
nation’s electricity.10 In October, Chancellor
Schröder announced plans to reduce Germany’s
greenhouse gas emissions 40 percent by 2020.11
Wind power will play a large role in this plan.
Spain experienced another strong growth
year as well, adding 1,490 megawatts for a total
of 4,830 megawatts, surpassing the United
States to rank second worldwide.12 This is an
impressive accomplishment, given that Spain’s
wind industry is not yet a decade old.
Denmark, a nation of just 5 million people,
also installed more wind capacity than the
United States. With the addition of nearly 500
megawatts, Denmark ended 2002 with about
2,880 megawatts, enough to generate 21 percent
of the country’s electricity.13 Much of this new
capacity is operating offshore, thanks to comple-
tion of the Horns Rev 160-megawatts project,
the world’s largest offshore wind farm.14
The United Kingdom, despite having the
best wind resources in Europe, continues to
experience slow growth. It ended 2002 with
about 556 megawatts of wind capacity, a 31-
megawatt increase.15 The future looks brighter,
however, as planning permission has been
granted for the next 450 turbines onshore and
the first 90 for offshore use.16
Italy added 100 megawatts to maintain its
position of sixth overall, ending the year with
about 800 megawatts.17 The Netherlands added
217 megawatts, for a total of 740 megawatts.18
And three new markets emerged—in Norway
(added 80 megawatts), Poland (30 megawatts),
and Latvia (21 megawatts).19
Beyond Europe and the United States, the
most significant growth was in Asia. India
added 250 megawatts, keeping it in fifth place
with 1,702 megawatts, while Japan’s capacity
rose 36 percent to 486 megawatts.20 Although
China’s market appears to have slowed in 2002,
rising by 16 percent to about 470 megawatts,
that country has more than 1,800 megawatts of
wind capacity in the development pipeline.21
Future growth in Japan and China is expected
to be rapid, as even offshore wind is now cost-
competitive with many conventional energy
options.22
The global wind industry currently employs
about 100,000 people.23 Most of the jobs are 
in Europe, and European companies manufac-
ture 80 percent of all wind turbines sold world-
wide.24 The global large-turbine market is
expected to surpass $16 billion annually by
2007.25 The investment firm Merrill Lynch
projects that wind power will grow 15-fold over
the next 20 years.26
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Wind Power’s Rapid Growth Continues
World Wind Energy Generating
Capacity, Total and Net
Annual Additions, 1980–2002
Annual
Year Total Addition
(megawatts)
1980 10 5
1981 25 15
1982 90 65
1983 210 120
1984 600 390
1985 1,020 420
1986 1,270 250
1987 1,450 180
1988 1,580 130
1989 1,730 150
1990 1,930 200
1991 2,170 240
1992 2,510 340
1993 2,990 500
1994 3,490 730
1995 4,780 1,290
1996 6,070 1,290
1997 7,640 1,570
1998 10,150 2,510
1999 13,930 3,780
2000 18,450 4,520
2001 24,930 6,480
2002 (prel) 31,650 6,720
Source: BTM Consult, EWEA, AWEA, and
BWE.
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Figure 2: Annual Addition to World Wind Energy 
Generating Capacity, 1980–2002
Figure 1: World Wind Energy Generating Capacity,
1980–2002
Global average temperature climbed to 14.52
degrees Celsius in 2002, supplanting 2001 as
the second hottest year since recordkeeping
began in the late 1800s, according to the God-
dard Institute for Space Studies.1 (See Figure 1.)
Other centers of climate analysis, using roughly
the same network of land and sea temperature
gauges, also rank 2002 as second only to 1998
in warmth, and find that the nine warmest
years have occurred since 1990.2
Scientists have linked the warming trend
that took off in the twentieth century to the
buildup of carbon dioxide (CO2)
and other heat-trapping gases.3 By
burning fossil fuels, people released
some 6.44 billion tons of carbon into the
atmosphere in 2002, a 1-percent increase over
the previous year, raising atmospheric CO2
concentration to 372.9 parts per million by vol-
ume.4 (See Figure 2.) 
Measurements taken at the Mauna Loa
Observatory in Hawaii show an 18-percent
increase in CO2 levels from 1960 to 2002.
5 Sci-
entists estimate that levels have risen 31
percent since the onset of the Industrial Revolu-
tion around 1750.6 The current concentration
has not been exceeded in at least 420,000
years—and likely in 20 million years.7
Oscillations in the temperature of the tropi-
cal Pacific Ocean are linked to atmospheric
CO2 levels as well as to year-to-year
fluctuations in temperature.8 The world’s
oceans, which contain about 50 times as much
CO2 as the atmosphere does, are able to take
up more carbon when cool.9 When the sea sur-
face warms in the equatorial Pacific, as it does
during an El Niño event, the ocean absorbs less
carbon, so atmospheric CO2 levels rise, along
with global temperature.10
In May 2002, ocean buoys in the central
Pacific started reading warmer-than-average
temperatures, heralding the onset of El Niño,
which persisted into 2003, sharply changing
patterns of rainfall, temperature, and winds in
some regions and contributing to, for instance,
droughts in India, Australia, and Africa and
floods in Europe.11 Scientists believe that this
El Niño may help push global average tempera-
ture to a new high in 2003.12
Indicators of a warming world abound. Biol-
ogists are recording spring events such as the first
flowering of plants and the arrival of migrant
birds occurring earlier, and are finding the geo-
graphic ranges of birds, butterflies, and herbs
moving poleward.13 Mountaintop glaciers are
retreating in Alaska, Asia, the Alps, Indonesia,
Africa, and South America.14 Global sea levels
rose in the twentieth century about 1–2 millime-
ters a year, faster than in the nineteenth century.15
Poor nations are the most vulnerable to cli-
mate change. As temperatures have risen on
mountaintops in Rwanda and in other African
highlands, malaria-carrying mosquitoes have
extended their range, infecting more people.16
Cholera bacteria thrived in the warm ocean
waters of the 1997–98 El Niño, which flooded
the Indian Ocean coast, prompting cholera out-
breaks in Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania,
and Mozambique.17 Over the last two decades,
floods and other weather-related disasters were
among the factors prompting some 10 million
people to migrate from Bangladesh to India.18
Wealthy nations contribute the most to cli-
mate change. With less than 5 percent of the
world’s population, the United States is the sin-
gle largest source of carbon from fossil fuel
burning—emitting 24 percent of the world’s
total.19 Per person, U.S. emissions are roughly
double that of other major industrial nations
and 17 times that of India.20 (See Figure 3.)
China, home to one fifth of the world’s people,
ranks a distant second to the United States in
emissions, with just 12 percent of the total.21
Some progress toward reducing global
carbon emissions was made in 2002, when
Japan, Canada, and the 15 nations of the Euro-
pean Union ratified the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on
climate change.22 For the protocol to come into
force, 55 nations representing 55 percent of the
1990 emissions of industrial and former
Eastern bloc nations must ratify it. By the end
of January 2003, 104 nations representing 44
percent of emissions had done so.23 As the
United States and Australia have pulled out of
the process, Russia must ratify the protocol for
it to come into force.24
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Carbon Emissions and Temperature Climb
Global Average Temperature
and Carbon Emissions from
Fossil Fuel Burning, 1950–2002,
and Atmospheric Concentrations
of Carbon Dioxide, 1960–2002
Carbon 
Year Temperature Emissions Dioxide
(degrees (mill. tons (parts per
Celsius) of carbon) mill.by vol.)
1950 13.87 1612 n.a.
1955 13.89 2013 n.a.
1960 14.01 2535 316.7
1965 13.9 3087 319.9
1970 14.02 3997 325.5
1975 13.94 4518 331.0
1976 13.86 4776 332.0
1977 14.11 4910 333.7
1978 14.02 4961 335.3
1979 14.09 5249 336.7
1980 14.16 5177 338.5
1981 14.22 5004 339.8
1982 14.06 4961 341.0
1983 14.25 4944 342.6
1984 14.07 5116 344.2
1985 14.03 5277 345.7
1986 14.12 5439 347.0
1987 14.27 5561 348.7
1988 14.29 5774 351.3
1989 14.19 5882 352.7
1990 14.37 5953 354.0
1991 14.32 6023 355.5
1992 14.14 5907 356.4
1993 14.14 5904 357.0
1994 14.25 6053 358.9
1995 14.37 6187 360.9
1996 14.23 6326 362.6
1997 14.40 6422 363.8
1998 14.56 6407 366.6
1999 14.32 6239 368.3
2000 14.31 6315 369.4
2001 14.46 6378 370.9
2002 (prel) 14.52 6443 372.9
Source: Goddard Institute for Space Studies,
ORNL, BP, IEA, DOE, IGU, LBL, and Scripps
Instit. of Oceanography.
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Figure 3: Carbon Emissions Per Person in Selected 
Countries, 2002
Figure 1: Global Average Temperature at Earth’s Surface,
1880–2002
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Gross world product (GWP)—the aggregated
estimate of the global output of goods and serv-
ices—increased 2.5 percent in 2002, to $48 tril-
lion (in 2001 dollars).1 (See Figure 1.)
Although this means the GWP reached another
new high, the increase was below the average of
3.9 percent seen over the years since 1950.2
The United States, which accounts for 22
percent of the GWP, increased output by 2.2
percent, driven primarily by robust consumer
spending that recovered quickly after the terror-
ist attacks in September 2001.3 Latin America’s
product declined by 0.7 percent, primarily due
to the economic crisis in Argentina, which in
turn reduced investor confidence
in the region.4 Asia’s economy
grew by 3.8 percent, spurred by
global trade, consumer demand in China and
South Korea, and the start of a recovery in the
information technology sector.5 In Africa, gross
regional product grew by 2.4 percent—just shy
of the global average—but per capita growth
there was a mere 0.3 percent as population
increased by 18 million.6
With the world’s population growing by 74
million in 2002, per capita GWP only increased
1.3 percent, to $7,714.7 Because governments
need to expand infrastructure to keep up with
growing numbers, the benefits of economic
growth are limited by population growth.8
In recent years, a growing number of experts
have challenged GWP as an accurate measure
of economic growth, let alone of progress.9 First
and foremost, GWP is an absolute measure,
counting all expenditures as positive contribu-
tions, regardless of their worth to society.10 It
also omits key economic sectors, like subsis-
tence farming and household maintenance.11
As a counter to this, Redefining Progress, a U.S.
nongovernmental research group, created the
Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), which sub-
tracts costs to the economy such as traffic, pol-
lution, and crime while adding unaccounted
benefits such as unpaid child care and
volunteer work. In the United States, per capita
GDP grew 77 percent from 1975 to 2000—
compared with GPI growth of just 2 percent.12
(See Figure 2.)
GWP also ignores the environmental costs of
economic activities and does not factor in the
value of nature’s services on which the global
economy depends. These services, such as food
production, waste treatment, and climate regu-
lation, have been estimated to be worth anywhere
from $18 trillion to $62 trillion—roughly the
size of the GWP itself.13 One recent analysis
determined that the wealth of several countries
has declined even while gross national product
has increased, once depletion of natural capital
is factored in.14
With growing concern about climate change
and shrinking natural resources, many
observers are questioning whether traditional
economic growth can continue to be thought of
as a positive. One measure, the “ecological foot-
print,” looks at per capita use of renewable
resources and compares this to the capacity of
Earth to generate them. This conservative esti-
mate, which does not include the needs of
other species, nonrenewable resource use, or
pollution, finds that on average each person
uses the resources of 2.3 “global hectares” of
productive land.15 Yet there is only an average
of 1.9 hectares of productive area available per
person globally.16
Thus humanity is withdrawing resources 20
percent faster than Earth can renew them (see
Figure 3) and is consequently depleting the
world’s ecological assets.17 Indeed, studies show
that humans have fully exploited or depleted
two thirds of ocean fisheries and have
transformed or degraded up to half of Earth’s
land.18
Few countries have remained within their
respective ecological capacities—let alone
within the global average—and many have far
exceeded them. The United States, for instance,
used up 9.7 hectares worth of resources per
person in 1999—45 percent more than the 5.3
hectares available to each citizen.19 Even with-
out continued population growth, if the world
were to consume as much meat and use as
much fossil fuels as Americans do, it would
need the resources of five Earths.20
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Economic Growth Inches Up
Gross World Product,
1950–2002
Year Total Per Person
(trill. 2001dollars) (2001dollars)
1950 6.7 2,641
1955 8.7 3,112
1960 10.7 3,516
1965 13.6 4,071
1970 17.5 4,708
1971 18.2 4,805
1972 19.1 4,933
1973 20.3 5,157
1974 20.8 5,174
1975 21.1 5,154
1976 22.1 5,312
1977 23.0 5,432
1978 24.0 5,573
1979 24.8 5,672
1980 25.3 5,688
1981 25.8 5,698
1982 26.1 5,664
1983 26.9 5,728
1984 28.1 5,890
1985 29.1 5,993
1986 30.1 6,101
1987 31.2 6,216
1988 32.5 6,375
1989 33.6 6,470
1990 34.2 6,492
1991 34.7 6,468
1992 35.4 6,499
1993 36.1 6,538
1994 37.3 6,663
1995 38.6 6,791
1996 40.1 6,964
1997 41.7 7,139
1998 42.7 7,202
1999 44.0 7,337
2000 46.0 7,566
2001 46.9 7,617
2002 (prel) 48.0 7,714
Source: Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development and 
International Monetary Fund.
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Developing and former Eastern bloc nations
borrow money from foreign banks and govern-
ments to finance transportation, power genera-
tion, schools, loans to local businesses, and
other sorts of development projects. In 2001,
their cumulative foreign debt shrunk
to $2.44 trillion.1 (See Figure 1.)
More than half of the debt is owed
to private, commercial lenders; the rest is owed
to national governments, the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
regional development banks.2
Some 78 percent of the debt in 2001 was
owed by middle-income nations, which
typically pay market-based interest rates and
borrow more heavily from commercial than
official lenders.3 The global economic slow-
down in 2001 made private banks more averse
to risk and less inclined to lend to developing
countries, as ratings agencies class some two
thirds of developing countries as “speculative-
grade” borrowers.4 New loans to developing
nations from private banks fell to $93 billion in
2001, a 25-percent drop from 2000.5
The IMF has proposed a Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) as a bank-
ruptcy process to streamline the restructuring
of developing-country debt that would be simi-
lar to what is in place within many countries
for companies and municipalities.6 This is
intended for commercial debt, so it would be of
most use in managing crises in middle-income
nations, such as Argentina’s economic
meltdown in 2001.7
While banks and creditor countries have
stalled the SDRM, other initiatives are more rel-
evant for low-income nations, which owed
roughly 22 percent of outstanding debt in
2001.8 These nations rely heavily on special
loans, some virtually interest-free, from the
World Bank and other government agencies.
Compared with other regions, sub-Saharan
Africa and South Asia owe a greater share of
their debt to official lenders.9 (See Figure 2.)
The total external debt of some nations is
higher than they will be able to repay. This
“debt overhang” deters foreign investment and
drags down the economy, as governments fail to
meet people’s basic health and education
needs.10 Zambia devoted more than 30 percent
of its budget to debt repayments each year in
the 1990s, for example, while spending roughly
10 percent on basic social services.11
Starting in the late 1980s, through the Paris
Club, creditor nations announced a series of spe-
cial terms for poor nations struggling with high
debt—offering longer repayment periods and
canceling some debts.12 Then in 1996 the Group
of Seven industrial nations called on the World
Bank and the IMF to administer a Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program,
which was expanded in 1999, largely in response
to pressure from a coalition of nongovernmental
organizations called Jubilee 2000.13
Some 42 countries, mostly in Africa, can
qualify for debt relief after they show a track
record of reforms to promote macroeconomic
stability and draw up a poverty reduction strat-
egy in consultation with civil society groups.14
As of January 2003, six nations had completed
the program, while another 21 had begun it.15
The HIPC relief is worth less than it appears
on paper because much of the debt could never
be repaid anyway.16 Many analysts have called
for greater debt forgiveness.17 As corrupt
governments have wasted or misappropriated
money in the past, and as some of the poorest
nations are now overwhelmed by the AIDS cri-
sis, a key challenge for donors and borrowers
will be ensuring that funds freed up by debt
relief go into areas of urgent need, such as pub-
lic health and primary education.18
Changes in the rules of world trade are
needed to help nations service their debts. Poor
nations get foreign currency to repay loans
through trade, relying heavily on exports of agri-
culture and textiles, which remain protected in
rich nations.19 The average person in a develop-
ing country selling into world markets confronts
barriers that are roughly twice as high as those
faced by counterparts in industrial nations.20 In
2002, the U.N. Development Programme called
on the World Trade Organization to open up its
meetings to counter back-room deals made by a
handful of wealthy nations that effectively limit
developing nations’ power to set trade rules.21
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Foreign Debt Declines
Trillion Dollars
(2001 dollars) 
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Foreign Debt of Developing
and Former Eastern Bloc
Nations, 1970–2001
Year Foreign Debt
(trillion 2001 dollars)
1970 0.27
1971 0.30
1972 0.34
1973 0.38
1974 0.44
1975 0.54
1976 0.62
1977 0.77
1978 0.90
1979 1.03
1980 1.13
1981 1.23
1982 1.34
1983 1.40
1984 1.41
1985 1.54
1986 1.65
1987 1.81
1988 1.76
1989 1.78
1990 1.85
1991 1.89
1992 1.94
1993 2.07
1994 2.25
1995 2.40
1996 2.46
1997 2.51
1998 2.72
1999 2.68
2000 2.59
2001 2.44
Source: World Bank.
Figure 2: Long-term Foreign Debt Owed by Developing
and Former Eastern Bloc Nations to Commercial and
Official Lenders, by Region, 2001
Figure 1: Foreign Debt of Developing and Former
Eastern Bloc Nations, 1970–2001
Global advertising expenditures grew 0.6
percent in 2002 to $444 billion; of this total,
$309 billion was spent on major media, includ-
ing television, radio, and newspaper.1 (See Fig-
ure 1.) This modest growth was almost fully
driven by the United States, which at $235 bil-
lion accounts for over half of the total advertis-
ing market.2 In 2002, U.S. advertising grew by
1.7 percent, stimulated by an economic recov-
ery and cyclical events like the Winter Olympics
and the U.S. congressional elections—the latter
generating $1 billion in ads.3 Yet
the worldwide increase followed a
fall of 9.2 percent in 2001, which
was triggered by the U.S. recession, the financial
market collapse, the Internet “bubble burst,”
and terrorist attacks.4
In Japan, which is the second largest adver-
tising market and buys 12 percent of major
media advertising, spending fell 5 percent in
2002.5 In Germany, the third biggest market
and the largest one in Europe, spending fell by
6 percent.6 In contrast, advertising in China,
the seventh largest market, is growing quickly;
it was unaffected by the downturn in 2001 and
has jumped 14 percent over the past two years.7
The global average advertising spending per
person for 2002 dropped slightly to $71 ($49
spent on major media), as increases in spending
were matched by population growth.8 (See Fig-
ure 2.) Yet this figure masks a huge variation
across countries. While major media ad spend-
ing stood at $4 per person in China and $282
per person in Japan, in the United States it was
$494 per person—10 times the global average.9
(See Figure 3.)
Advertising promotes consumer spending,
which in its current form is harming environ-
mental and human well-being. In 2001, for
instance, 5 of the top 10 advertisers were car
companies.10 And even while the economy stag-
nated that year, the global passenger car fleet
grew to 523 million, with production of new cars
reaching 40 million.11 Cars burn vast quantities
of oil—polluting the air, contributing to respira-
tory diseases, and stoking climate change.12
The pharmaceutical industry, the sixth
largest global advertiser, spent $2.5 billion on
television and print advertising in 2000 in the
United States, directly targeting consumers and
generating demand for drugs.13 While pharma-
ceuticals can help save lives, advertising can
promote unnecessary use of expensive drugs.14
A recent survey of U.S. physicians found that 92
percent of patients requested an advertised drug
from their doctors and that 47 percent of those
doctors felt pressured to prescribe those drugs.15
Advertising has become pervasive in daily
life and continues to expand into new realms.
Increasingly, advertisers are marketing to chil-
dren to shape consumption preferences early
and to take advantage of the growing amount 
of money that people are spending on children,
which hit $405 billion in 2000.16 American
children are bombarded with 40,000 television
ads per year, up from 20,000 in the 1970s.17
Half of these encourage children to request
unhealthful food and drinks.18
In addition, embedded ads, such as product
placements in movies, can seriously influence
children. In a recent study, researchers found
that smoking in movies is strongly associated
with youth smoking habits—as strongly as
other social influences, such as parental or 
sibling smoking habits.19 U.S. advertising to
children has spread to schools, where ads 
adorn walls, sporting equipment, and even 
educational programming.20
To reduce children’s exposure to marketing,
several countries, including Denmark, Greece,
and Belgium, restrict television advertising to
children; Sweden and Norway totally ban it.21
Even full bans are only partly effective, however,
because satellites can beam television ads from
other countries into restricted markets.22
Public interest groups are also working to
reduce children’s exposure to advertising and to
teach children about marketing motives. In the
United States, a campaign of the American
Legacy Foundation known as The Truth uses
controversial ads, education, and grassroots
activism to challenge teens not to get manipu-
lated by the tobacco industry’s marketing into
starting a lethal habit.23
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Advertising Spending Stays Nearly Flat
World Advertising
Expenditures, 1950–2002
Advertising Expenditures
Year Expenditures Per Person
(bill. 2001dollars) (2001 dollars)
1950 46 18
1955 72 26
1960 89 29
1965 117 35
1970 130 35
1971 136 36
1972 144 37
1973 156 40
1974 154 38
1975 150 37
1976 161 39
1977 171 40
1978 192 45
1979 203 46
1980 211 47
1981 208 46
1982 206 45
1983 213 45
1984 224 47
1985 235 48
1986 264 54
1987 300 60
1988 327 64
1989 334 64
1990 349 66
1991 345 64
1992 356 65
1993 354 64
1994 378 68
1995 414 73
1996 427 74
1997 431 74
1998 437 74
1999 456 76
2000 486 80
2001 441 72
2002 (prel) 444 71
Source: Coen.
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Figure 2: Advertising Expenditures Per Person, 1950–2002
Figure 1: World Advertising Expenditures, 1950–2002
Figure 3: Major Media Advertising Per Person, 
Selected Countries, 2002
International tourism increased 3 percent in
2002, to 715 million arrivals, according to pre-
liminary estimates by the World Tourism Orga-
nization.1 (See Figure 1.) 
This better-than-expected growth came after
one of the most difficult episodes in recent
tourism history. In 2001, for the first time in
nearly 20 years, international tourist arrivals
actually declined, by 0.6 percent.2 The drop
reflected the impacts of both the September 11
terrorist attacks in the United States
and the global economic slowdown.3
Receipts from international tourism
fell nearly 5 percent in 2001, to $462 billion (in
2001 dollars).4 (See Figure 2.) (Receipt
estimates for 2002 are not yet available.)
The industry is still reeling from these exten-
sive losses. The World Travel & Tourism Council
(WTTC) reports that global tourism employ-
ment was down nearly 2 percent in 2002, gener-
ating 3 million fewer jobs than two years
earlier.5 And the world’s airlines experienced
near-zero growth in traffic in 2002, following
what the International Air Transport Association
has called the “worst year in the history of air
transport.”6
In 2001, the combination of lower passenger
travel, a weak global economy, and, in some
cases, overambitious expansion strategies con-
tributed to net financial losses of $12 billion for
the world’s airlines.7 Many carriers were forced
to cut routes, lay off personnel, and restructure
operations; in 2002, industry heavyweights US
Airways and United Airlines both filed for bank-
ruptcy.8 Analysts expect brighter news for the
airline industry in 2003, the one-hundredth
anniversary of aviation.9
If global conditions improve, the tourism
industry may be well on its way to resuming its
strong historic growth.10 Since 1950, interna-
tional tourist arrivals have increased nearly 28-
fold, growing at an average annual rate of 7
percent.11
Europe remains the top destination—captur-
ing 58 percent of arrivals in 2002—though its
share of the world’s tourists continues to fall
from a high of 75 percent in 1964.12 (See Figure
3.) France was the most visited country in
2002, followed by Spain, the United States,
Italy, and China.13
For the first year ever, the share of the
world’s tourists visiting East Asia and the Pacific
surpassed the portion visiting the Americas—
reaching nearly 18 percent (up from less than 1
percent in 1950).14 Arrivals to Asia are expected
to double within the next decade, and by 2020
the region could attract a quarter of all tourism
traffic.15
In the past decade alone, China has risen
from twelfth to fifth place on the list of most vis-
ited nations.16 And in 2001, it edged out the
United Kingdom as the fifth highest earner of
tourism receipts worldwide.17 By 2020, China is
predicted to be the top international destination,
attracting some 130 million visitors a year.18
Overall, tourism-related spending accounted
for some $4.2 trillion of global economic activ-
ity in 2002 and represented 12 percent of total
world exports, according to WTTC.19 And
despite the employment slowdown, the activity
generated an estimated 199 million jobs—one
in every 13 jobs worldwide.20
The growing global dependence on tourism
has its downside, however. On average, up to
half of all tourism income in developing coun-
tries “leaks” out of the destination, with much
of it going to industrial nations through foreign
ownership of hotels and tour companies.21 And
tourism poses a growing threat to the world’s
natural areas—from small islands to high peaks
and the poles.22 Tourist transportation and
infrastructure, as well as the sheer volume of
visitors, can bring serious pollution and habitat
destruction.23
One promising new trend is “sustainable
tourism”—environmentally and socially
conscious travel that can help protect natural
assets as well as generate local income.24 The
rise in “green” hotels and voluntary codes of
conduct for tour operators may lessen the envi-
ronmental effects of the tourism boom.25 And
ongoing efforts to create a Sustainable Tourism
Stewardship Council may help the industry
develop new international standards for
tourism certification.26
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Tourism Growing But Still Shaky
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Year Arrivals Receipts
(million) (bill. 2001 dollars)
1950 25 13
1955 47 25
1960 69 34
1965 113 53
1970 166 67
1971 179 75
1972 189 85
1973 199 101
1974 206 101
1975 222 111
1976 229 115
1977 249 135
1978 267 156
1979 277 176
1980 286 202
1981 287 172
1982 286 167
1983 290 163
1984 316 173
1985 327 175
1986 339 208
1987 364 249
1988 395 279
1989 426 291
1990 457 333
1991 463 338
1992 501 376
1993 516 375
1994 550 405
1995 565 453
1996 597 478
1997 618 472
1998 636 468
1999 652 477
2000 696 486
2001 693 462
2002 (prel) 715 —
Source: World Tourism Organization.
Figure 2: International Tourism Receipts, 1950–2001
Figure 3: Share of International Tourist Arrivals 
by Region, 1950–2002
Figure 1: International Tourist Arrivals, 1950–2002
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Between 1978 and 2002, the number of World
Heritage Sites worldwide increased from 12 to
735.1 (See Figure 1.) The global total now
stands at 730, as several adjacent properties
have been merged.2
The United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) confers
World Heritage status on cultural or natural
sites considered to be of “outstanding value to
humanity.” 3 The current list includes 563 cul-
tural sites (buildings, monuments,
and properties with aesthetic,
anthropological, archaeological, eth-
nological, historical, or scientific value); 144
natural sites (areas with scientific, conservation,
or aesthetic value; outstanding physical, biolog-
ical, and geological formations; or habitats of
threatened plant or animal species); and 23
“mixed” sites.4
The properties are located in 125 countries
on six continents.5 Europe, with its heavy con-
centration of monuments and religious archi-
tecture, is home to nearly half of the properties
recognized by UNESCO (323 sites), while Asia
has nearly a quarter (163 sites).6 (See Figure 2.)
Spain and Italy contain the most individual
properties, with at least 35 each, followed by
China, France, and Germany.7 (See Figure 3.) 
The idea of protecting the world’s shared
heritage emerged after World War I in response
to growing concern about threats to important
cultural and natural landmarks.8 UNESCO
launched the first truly global campaign to save
cultural heritage in 1960, when 50 countries
raised $80 million to dismantle and rescue the
ancient Egyptian temples of Abu Simbel from
flooding due to construction of the Aswan High
Dam.9 Other early campaigns focused on con-
serving Venice in Italy, Pakistan’s Bronze Age
city of Moenjodaro, and the Buddhist temples
of Borobodur in Indonesia.10
The formal World Heritage List was estab-
lished in 1972 following adoption of the Con-
vention Concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage (the World Her-
itage Convention).11 The agreement’s 175
signatory countries have pledged to collectively
protect natural and cultural areas of “outstand-
ing universal value” that transcend national
boundaries and belong to all of humanity.12
Earning World Heritage status can be an
important way to attract tourist dollars and
other resources to national parks, historic land-
marks, and other properties. Member countries
must individually nominate sites for inclusion
on the list. Once a site is approved, governments
are encouraged to report on the progress of con-
servation and to raise public awareness about
the property. But not all nominees make the cut:
many countries face instability or lack financial
or other support, which prevents them from
meeting the strict listing requirements.13 Never-
theless, UNESCO aims to increase the number
and diversity of sites, particularly in Africa.14
Some existing sites already risk deterioration
or disappearance. UNESCO’s List of World Her-
itage in Danger now includes 33 properties,
most of which are in Africa.15 They face a wide
range of threats—from armed conflict to aban-
donment, rampant urban or tourist develop-
ment, and changes in land use or ownership.16
Many properties also face environmental
dangers, including pollution, poaching, flood-
ing, and natural disasters like earthquakes,
landslides, and volcanic eruptions.17 Mali’s
great mosques of Timbuktu are increasingly at
risk of encroachment by desert sands, while
mining operations threaten both Yellowstone
National Park in the United States and the
Mount Nimba Strict Nature Reserve spanning
Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire.18
To date, UNESCO-sponsored campaigns
have raised more than $1.5 billion for site
preservation worldwide.19 The organization
provides technical assistance and professional
training to treaty member countries, as well as
emergency assistance to endangered sites.20
The world’s natural heritage got an addi-
tional boost in November 2002 when Conser-
vation International in the United States and
the United Nations Foundation announced a
three-year, $15-million partnership to support
conservation efforts in new and existing proper-
ties. Sixteen of the world’s 25 so-called
biodiversity hotspots are also designated as
World Heritage Sites.21
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Figure 1: World Heritage Sites, 1978–2002
Figure 2: Share of World Heritage Sites by Region, 2002
Figure 3: Top Locations for World Heritage Sites, by Country
World Heritage Sites,
1978–2002
Year Sites
(cumulative number)
1978 12
1979 57
1980 85
1981 111
1982 135
1983 164
1984 187
1985 217
1986 248
1987 289
1988 316
1989 323
1990 340
1991 362
1992 382
1993 415
1994 444
1995 473
1996 510
1997 556
1998 586
1999 634
2000 695
2001 726
2002 735
Source: UNESCO.
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Global passenger car production grew 2 percent
in 2002, to 40.6 million units.1 This is still
slightly below the 2000 peak output of 41.1 mil-
lion.2 Since 1950, annual car production has
grown fivefold.3 (See Figure 1.) Production of
sport utility vehicles and other “light trucks”
reached a record 15.8 million in 2002, 6 percent
more than in 2001.4 Revised estimates show the
global passenger car fleet reaching 531 million
in 2002.5 (See Figure 2.) The United States has
one quarter of the cars in the world.6
Reflecting continued overcapacity in the
industry, passenger car production outpaced
sales by almost 2 million vehicles,
or more than 5 percent.7 But light
trucks continued to be popular,
outrunning production in 2002 by more than 1
million (almost 9 percent).8 Once primarily
used for hauling loads, light trucks are now
heavily marketed as passenger vehicles. But
even more so than cars, they are increasingly
important contributors to air pollution and cli-
mate change. In the United States, model-year
2001 light trucks emitted 2.4 times more smog-
forming pollutants and 1.4 times more carbon
than passenger cars.9
Driving a gasoline-powered car accounts for
about 68 percent of the greenhouse gases emit-
ted over the life of the vehicle, but producing
and distributing the fuel on which it runs
accounts for another 21 percent, while manu-
facturing the car itself contributes the rest.10
Automobile carbon emissions could be
reduced significantly by boosting fuel efficiency.
Yet fuel economy has remained flat since 1990 in
the United States, after substantial improvements
since the early 1970s.11 Efforts to raise mandated
fuel efficiency standards failed in the mid-1990s
and again in 2002.12 Carmakers exploit exemp-
tions and loopholes in existing standards, and
the Bush administration is considering tax meas-
ures that would provide more incentive for buy-
ers to choose the biggest gas-guzzlers.13
In 1970, Americans drove some 80 million
cars close to 1 trillion miles (almost 1.6 trillion
kilometers), burning 5.25 million barrels of fuel
per day (mb/d) and emitting 193 million tons
of carbon.14 By 2000, there were about 128 mil-
lion cars—60 percent more. They traveled 2.3
trillion miles (a growth of 146 percent),
consumed 8.2 mb/d of fuel (up 56 percent), and
emitted 302 million tons of carbon (also 56
percent more).15 (See Figure 3.)
In the rest of the world, car density relative
to population is much lower than in the United
States. In Western Europe and Japan, it is cur-
rently comparable to the level the United States
reached in the early 1970s; in Eastern Europe,
it is similar to that in the 1930s; and in other
regions it is even lower.16
People outside the United States also use their
cars less than Americans. For instance, the aver-
age car in the United States travels 10 percent
more per year than a car in the United Kingdom,
about 50 percent more than one in Germany, and
almost 200 percent more than a car in Japan.17
And Americans drive less fuel-efficient cars, so
these figures understate the national differences
in gasoline used for driving.18
The United States consumed 43 percent of
the 19.1 mb/d of world gasoline use for all trans-
portation purposes in 1999.19 (This number
overstates the U.S. share of road fuel use, how-
ever, because it does not include diesel fuels,
which are popular in Europe.)20 All in all, the
carbon emissions of U.S. automobiles are roughly
equivalent to those of the entire Japanese econ-
omy—the world’s fourth-largest carbon emitter.21
The leaders in fuel economy are Honda,
Hyundai, Volkswagen, and Subaru. The U.S.
“Big Three,” by contrast—General Motors,
Ford, and Daimler-Chrysler—are among the
laggards.22 One analysis of the six largest
carmakers also finds that the Japanese firms
Honda, Toyota, and Nissan have a “cleaner”
record with regard to smog-forming pollutants
than the Big Three.23
To date, only Honda and Toyota have intro-
duced “hybrid electric” cars (in which electric
power supplements the internal combustion
engine, which lowers fuel intake and pollu-
tants).24 Vehicles running on all different types
of alternative power currently account for only
a tiny share of the total car fleet. In the United
States, fewer than 380,000 such vehicles were
on the roads in 2001.25
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Figure 3: Distance Driven and Carbon Emitted by U.S.
Automobiles, 1970–2000
Figure 2: World Passenger Car Fleet, 1950–2002
Figure 1: World Automobile Production, 1950–2002
World Automobile Production,
1950–2002
Year Production
(million)
1950 8 0
1955 11.0
1960 12.8
1965 19.0
1970 22.5
1971 26.5
1972 27.9
1973 30.0
1974 26.0
1975 25.0
1976 28.9
1977 30.5
1978 31.2
1979 30.8
1980 28.6
1981 27.5
1982 26.7
1983 30.0
1984 30.5
1985 32.4
1986 32.9
1987 33.1
1988 34.4
1989 35.7
1990 36.3
1991 35.1
1992 35.5
1993 34.2
1994 34.8
1995 35.5
1996 36.9
1997 39.1
1998 38.4
1999 39.9
2000 41.1
2001 39.8
2002 (prel) 40.6
Source: DRI-WEFA, American Automobile
Manufacturers Association, and Global
Insight.
Global production of bicycles fell by some 7 per-
cent in 2001, to 97 million units, as the produc-
tion oscillations of the 1990s continued into the
new century.1 (See Figure 1.) And although pro-
duction data are not yet available for 2002, pre-
liminary indications suggest that the industry’s
sluggish performance continued.2
The fluctuating market is more a reflection 
of difficulties in inventory management due to
globalization of the bicycle industry than it is of
changes in demand. As production concentrates
in Asia, sellers in distant markets, especially in
Europe and the United States, must order
stock based on estimates of the strength
of their own markets six months or more
in advance.3 Retailers often miscalculate, leaving
themselves with burgeoning inventories that are
later unloaded, depressing new orders.4 The
result is a seesaw global production cycle in the
face of flat global demand.
In the United States, for example, domestic
production in 2001 continued its decade-long
decline, and imports fell by 19 percent over
2000, yet robust sales were supported by draw-
ing down the millions of bicycles in stock
around the country.5
The decade-long trend in concentration of
production is evident in several ways. Bicycle
factories are increasingly rare in the United
States, Mexico, and the European Union, as
manufacturers move to countries with lower
production costs, including Viet Nam and sev-
eral in Eastern Europe.6
China is another major site for new bicycle
factories, which has helped consolidate that
country’s grip on global production. In 2001,
China produced 53 percent of the world’s bicy-
cles, perhaps the first time ever that one nation
has supplied more than half of global output.7
(See Figure 2.) Increasingly, these bikes are
headed overseas: Chinese exports more than
doubled between 1997 and 2001, from 14 mil-
lion units to nearly 35 million.8 But China also
remains the world’s leading user of bicycles,
despite a steady decline in bicycle use over the
past decade.9
Chinese inroads into the global market are
especially impressive given the barriers to their
bicycles that exist in many countries. The Euro-
pean Union and Canada both have stiff import
duties on Chinese bikes.10 The United States, 
in contrast, does not levy such “dumping”
duties.11 So some 40 percent of Chinese bike
exports were shipped to the United States in
2001, accounting for 87 percent of bicycles
brought into the country.12
The sluggish bicycle market stands in
contrast to scattered local interest in promoting
more diverse urban transportation systems,
including an expanded role for bicycles. The
disadvantages of car-centered transportation,
including air pollution, sprawl, and congestion,
have prompted many cities to rethink their
transportation priorities. Programs that restrict
the use of private cars for a day are on the rise;
some 2,000–3,000 “car-free days” of varying
levels of comprehensiveness have been held in
the past 10 years.13 The residents of Bogotá,
Colombia, voted overwhelmingly to make that
city’s February 2000 car-free-day experiment 
an annual event, and in 2002 eight other
Colombian cities restricted car use for a day.14
Such initiatives help citizens imagine a
transportation system with options other than
cars. Many cities build on this conceptual shift
by providing bikeways, the physical space
needed to make cycling safe and enjoyable.
Bogotá has a network of hundreds of kilometers
of bikeways under construction, and Santiago’s
Urban Transport Plan calls for building some
1,000 kilometers of bikeways.15
Done well, the bikeway strategy can be
extremely successful, as experience in Europe
demonstrates. The Netherlands has doubled the
length of its network of bikeways in the past 20
years, and Germany has tripled its network.16
Cycling accounts for some 12 percent of all
trips in Germany, and for some 27 percent in
the Netherlands, compared with less than 1
percent in the United States, where bicycle
infrastructure is much less extensive and less
sophisticated.17 In addition, there are about
four times as many cycling fatalities per kilome-
ter traveled in the United States as in Germany
or the Netherlands.18
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Figure 2: Chinese Bicycle Production as a Share of
World Production, 1990–2001
Figure 1: World Bicycle Production, 1950–2001
World Bicycle Production,
1950–2001
Year Production
(million)
1950 11
1955 15
1960 20
1965 21
1970 36
1971 39
1972 46
1973 52
1974 52
1975 43
1976 47
1977 49
1978 51
1979 54
1980 62
1981 65
1982 69
1983 74
1984 76
1985 79
1986 84
1987 98
1988 105
1989 95
1990 91
1991 96
1992 99
1993 99
1994 102
1995 103
1996 96
1997 90
1998 76
1999 95
2000 104
2001 97
Source: Bicycle Retailer and Industry News
and United Nations.
Both mobile phones and the Internet attracted
new users at double-digit rates in 2002, albeit
more slowly than in the 1990s. The number of
mobile or cellular phone subscribers worldwide
in 2002 topped 1.15 billion, an increase of 21
percent over 2001.1 (See Figure 1.) For the first
time, mobile phones outnumbered fixed-line
phone connections (1.05 billion).2 At the same
time, use of the Internet expanded,
thanks in part to a 16.5-percent increase
in host computers in 2002 to 171.6 mil-
lion, drawing more than 600 million people
online regularly.3 (See Figure 2.)
Within just one decade, the ranks of people
communicating by wireless phones and wired
computers have swelled significantly. In 1992,
only one in 237 people worldwide used a
mobile phone, and one in 778 used the Internet;
by 2002, the numbers had soared to one in 5
and one in 10, respectively.4 Today, well over 90
percent of all nations have local cell phone and
Internet service, whereas in 1992, a person
could use a cell phone in only one third of all
countries and hook up to the Internet through 
a local number in just 19 percent.5
By linking computers with phones, the Inter-
net sped the convergence of communications
and computing technologies in the 1990s.6 Now,
as mobile phones proliferate, more people are
making wireless connections to the Internet.7
Since 2002, a growing number of U.S. cities
have set up systems in parks and public spaces
that give free Internet access to people with
wireless modems in their laptop computers.8
In Europe, more people send and receive short
text messages with their cell phones than use
the Internet from personal computers.9
Cell phones have helped bridge the tele-
phonic divide between rich and poor. Building
towers for them is cheaper than stringing
copper wires for fixed-line phones, so start-up
mobile services can recoup their investments
and expand their coverage more quickly. As the
average price of mobile phones has dropped by
nearly 10 percent a year, it has fallen within
reach of more people.10 Between 1992 and 2001,
phone penetration—the number of fixed lines
and of mobiles per 100 people—accelerated 
in developing nations.11 (See Figure 3.)
Gaps in phone access have closed more
quickly in some countries than others, with
striking differences among the nations in 
transition from planned to market economies.
Central European nations, quick to invite
mobile competition, saw dramatic gains in
phone penetration in the 1990s; Hungary, for
instance, went from 9.6 phone connections per
100 people in 1990 to 67.4 per 100 in 2000.12
During the same period, in former Soviet
republics in Central Asia, where the state still
controls most telecom services, phone penetra-
tion did not grow beyond 20 per 100.13
Mobile service has dramatically increased
access to phones in Africa. Uganda, the one
nation where all three of Africa’s leading cellu-
lar companies compete, in 1999 became the
first country in that continent to have more
mobile than fixed-line customers.14 Some 30
other African nations have followed, as more
people have hooked into the phone network 
in a few years of cellular expansion than in all
the decades since independence.15 Mobiles 
outnumber fixed lines in Africa today at a
higher ratio than on any other continent.16
A greater gap separates those with and with-
out Internet access, but this digital divide is
also narrowing. In 2001, the industrial world
had 41 Internet users per 100 people, whereas
developing nations had 2.3 per 100—still a 17
to 1 ratio, but much better than the 40 to 1
ratio in 1995.17 By linking rural farmers to mar-
ket information, craftworkers to customers,
patients to doctors, and students to teachers,
the Internet can aid economic development.
Cheap computers with nonproprietary soft-
ware, designed to be shared at public libraries,
cyber cafes, and telecenters, could bring the
Internet to even more people. Indian scientists
have built a handheld “Simputer”—short for
Simple, Inexpensive, Multilingual Computer—
for poor, rural users that is expected to reach
the market in 2003.18 While the computer itself
will cost about $200, people will be able to rent
time on one—for instance, to check commodity
prices or consult doctors—and to store their
own data on $1–2 cards.19
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Communications Networks Expand
Cellular Phone Subscribers 
and Internet Host Computers
Worldwide, 1985–2002
Cellular Phone Internet Host 
Year Subscribers Computers
(million) (number)
1985 1 2,308
1986 1 5,089
1987 2 28,174
1988 4 80,000
1989 7 159,000
1990 11 376,000
1991 16 727,000
1992 23 1,313,000
1993 34 2,170,000
1994 56 5,846,000
1995 91 14,352,000
1996 144 21,819,000
1997 215 29,670,000
1998 319 43,230,000
1999 491 72,398,092
2000 741 109,574,429
2001 955 147,344,723
2002 1,155 171,638,297
Source: International Telecommunication
Union, Internet Software Consortium, and
Network Wizards.
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Figure 2: Internet Host Computers, 1981–2002
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Figure 1: Cellular Phone Subscribers Worldwide,
1985–2002
Sales of semiconductors, the brains behind mod-
ern electronics, rose in 2002 after the largest
crash in nearly 50 years of semiconductor 
manufacturing.1 (See Figure 1.) During 2000,
semiconductor sales surged from $150 billion 
to $209 billion (in 2001 dollars), setting the
record for the largest one-year rise in sales and
the strongest sales ever.2 The following year pro-
vided the antithesis: the largest one-year drop in
history to a level just below that in 1996—$139
billion. Sales remained virtually stagnant in
2002, with a gain of only $500 million.3
On a decadal time scale, however, the semi-
conductor industry is growing. From 1970 to
2002, the average annual growth for the indus-
try was 9 percent, and during the
1980s and 1990s the industry grew
1.8 and then 2.8 times faster than
the global economy.4 Despite continued
demand for its products, the industry has
collapsed four times in its history: a crash of
$7.6 billion in 1985, of $16.6 billion in 1996, 
of $14.1 billion in 1998 during the Asian finan-
cial crisis, and of $70.3 billion in 2001.5
A combination of factors led to the recent
losses, most notably the dot-com bust in early
2000 and a global recession that picked up
steam mid-2001.6 Some analysts also blame 
an inventory glut spurred by poor forecasting,
with semiconductor (chip) manufacturers over-
producing to gain nonexistent market share.7
The 2002 growth was led solely by the Asia-
Pacific region (excluding Japan), where the
market grew by 31 percent.8 (See Figure 2.)
China continues to be a focus for chip makers.9
The International Expo Group forecasts the
Chinese market to reach almost 9 percent of
world semiconductor sales in 2003, making it
the second-largest market in the world.10 Sales
in the Americas, Europe, and Japan all contin-
ued to decline in 2002.11
Although chips are bought around the
world, production is primarily confined to East
Asia, Europe, and North America. A 1999 
survey of U.S.-based companies found that 59
percent of their employees were located in the
United States, 33 percent in Asia, 6 percent in
Europe, and 2 percent in Latin America.12
To avoid the cost and liability of a $3–5 
billion fabrication facility, most semiconductor
firms outsource some or all of their production
to the “Big Three” foundries—Taiwan Semicon-
ductor Manufacturing Company, United Micro-
electronics Corporation in Taiwan, and
Chartered in Singapore.13 Major firms are cur-
rently outsourcing fewer products, fighting to
keep their own plants at full capacity, although
AMD and Motorola indicate that in a market
upswing they plan to outsource 25 percent and
50 percent of their production, respectively.14
Semiconductors undoubtedly have positive
environmental results for society, such as the
ability to telecommute and the heightened 
efficiency of industrial processes. Yet issues 
surrounding production and disposal, as well 
as the health of production workers, cloud this
industry’s sleek image.15
According to a recent study, the negative
environmental impacts of high-tech are
manifest to a greater degree in the production
phase of a chip’s life-cycle; this contrasts
considerably with a consumer product like an
automobile, where the major environmental
impacts arise in the use phase.16 The total weight
of fossil fuels and chemicals used to produce a
2-gram DRAM, or memory chip, is 630 times the
weight of the chip itself, pointing to the exis-
tence of a secondary materials stream.17 Over
its life cycle, which includes both production
and use, this 2-gram chip requires 1,600 grams
of fossil fuels, 72 grams of chemicals, 32,000
grams of water, and 700 grams of harmless ele-
mental gases during its life.18
Another environmental problem is disposal,
which is compounded by the complexity of the
devices and their short-term usefulness. In the
past, an average computer lasted four to five
years; the trend today is retirement after just
two years.19 One study predicts greater
recycling of this electronic waste (e-waste), but
another study recently exposed toxic e-waste
recycling facilities in China and India and esti-
mated that 50–80 percent of e-waste generated
in the United States is exported for recycling.20
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1954–2002
Year Sales
(billion 2001 dollars)
1954 0.03
1960 3.20
1965 5.98
1970 8.85
1971 7.89
1972 8.60
1973 14.00
1974 15.54
1975 13.39
1976 15.52
1977 16.04
1978 19.28
1979 22.41
1980 26.66
1981 23.51
1982 23.95
1983 28.44
1984 39.98
1985 32.37
1986 39.23
1987 47.11
1988 63.16
1989 65.31
1990 63.87
1991 66.63
1992 71.37
1993 89.93
1994 116.13
1995 161.06
1996 144.43
1997 147.25
1998 133.17
1999 156.67
2000 209.24
2001 138.90
2002 (prel) 139.40
Source: Semiconductor Industry Association.
Figure 2: Regional Breakdown of Semiconductor Sales,
2002
Figure 1: World Semiconductor Sales, 1954–2002
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Population Growth Slows
HIV/AIDS Pandemic Spreads Further
Cigarette Production Dips Slightly
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Between 2001 and 2002, births exceeded deaths
by 74 million, pushing world population over
6.2 billion.1 (See Figure 1.) Last year’s growth of
1.18 percent was the lowest since rates peaked
above 2 percent in the mid-1960s.2 With a larger
population growing at a slower rate, the number
of people added to the planet annually has in
fact remained about the same, and the human
family has more than doubled since 1960.3
Although deaths from AIDS and lower than
expected fertility prompted the United Nations
to reduce its global population pro-
jections—to 8.9 billion people by
2050, not 9.3 billion—the 49 poor-
est countries in the world still have populations
that are increasing at 2.4 percent per year,
nearly 10 times the 0.25 percent annual growth
in industrial nations.4 All the countries with the
highest birth rates are among the world’s poor-
est. (See Figure 2.)
Population growth is slowest in nations that
moved from Communist rule in the 1990s, as
higher mortality and higher emigration
followed the collapse of economies. A growing
gap in life expectancy divides Western Europe,
where only 10 percent live below the poverty
line, from Central and Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union, where the share of the
people living on less than $4 a day skyrocketed
from 3.3 percent in 1988 to 46 percent—nearly
half the populace—by the end of the 1990s.5
Sharp declines in birth rates in a few popu-
lous nations are largely responsible for the
slower growth of world numbers since the late
1960s. In Indonesia, the average number of
children born to each woman in 1950–55 was
5.5; by 1995–2000, the figure had fallen to 2.6.6
Over the same period, fertility fell in Brazil
from 6.2 to 2.3 children.7 By 2000, fertility had
dropped below the replacement level of 2.1
children per woman in 17 nations in the devel-
oping world, including China.8
Lower fertility and slower population
growth have been linked, since 1970, with eco-
nomic development in Brazil, Mexico, and sev-
eral East Asian nations.9 With better health
care, death rates declined. And with better
access to contraceptives, people had fewer chil-
dren and more women could work outside the
home. A demographic window of opportunity
for development opened, with a large group of
working-age people supporting relatively fewer
dependents—both older and younger.10
The labor force in Indonesia, Singapore,
South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand grew more
rapidly than total population by about 25 per-
cent a year between 1960 and 1990—a demo-
graphic bonus that boosted per capita income
by 0.8 percent a year.11 Similarly, declining fer-
tility in Brazil increased per capita income by
0.7 percent annually.12 With a smaller share of
the population in school, countries could raise
spending per child. Analysts credit the East
Asian “economic miracle” to public invest-
ments made in education, health care, and
opportunities for women.13
Population growth is increasingly concen-
trated in cities. As the pace of growth in cities
has outstripped that of rural areas for more
than a century, the share of the world living in
urban areas has grown steadily—from 10
percent in 1900 to 30 percent in 1950 to nearly
48 percent in 2001.14 The United Nations esti-
mates that some 2 billion people will be added
to world population between 2000 and 2030—
nearly all of them in urban areas of the develop-
ing world.15 In this “medium-growth” scenario,
the urban share of world population will pass
50 percent in 2007 and top 60 percent by
2030.16 (See Figure 3.)
As population swells in urban centers of
poor nations and wanes in some richer nations,
more people are likely to migrate. The United
States is the only industrial nation with a fertil-
ity rate still above replacement level, partly due
to immigrants.17 In Japan, whose population is
aging faster than any other nation’s, the average
age is expected to rise from 41 to 53 between
2000 and 2050 as the population contracts by
14 percent.18 Populations are also expected to
age and shrink throughout Europe, where con-
cern about the strain on pension and health
care systems is mounting at the same time that
rising numbers of migrants face an anti-immi-
grant backlash.19
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World Population, Total and
Annual Addition, 1950–2002
Year Total1 Annual Addition
(billion) (million)
1950 2.555 38
1955 2.780 53
1960 3.040 41
1965 3.346 70
1970 3.708 78
1971 3.786 77
1972 3.862 76
1973 3.939 76
1974 4.014 73
1975 4.087 72
1976 4.159 72
1977 4.232 72
1978 4.304 75
1979 4.379 76
1980 4.455 76
1981 4.530 80
1982 4.611 80
1983 4.691 79
1984 4.770 80
1985 4.850 82
1986 4.932 85
1987 5.017 86
1988 5.103 86
1989 5.189 87
1990 5.275 84
1991 5.359 84
1992 5.443 81
1993 5.524 80
1994 5.605 81
1995 5.685 79
1996 5.764 80
1997 5.844 79
1998 5.923 78
1999 6.002 77
2000 6.079 75
2001 6.154 74
2002 (prel) 6.228 74
1Total at mid-year.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Figure 1: World Population, 1950–2002
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Figure 3: Urban and Rural Population, 1970 and 2000,
with Projections for 2030
Figure 2: Countries with the Highest Fertility Levels,
2000–05
The number of people living with HIV/AIDS
rose to 42 million at the end of 2002.1 Five mil-
lion people became infected with HIV in 2002
(see Figure 1), and another 3.1 million died of
AIDS-related causes.2 (See Figure 2.)
For the first time, women account for half
the people living with HIV/AIDS.3 Heterosexual
transmission, particularly in Africa and the
Caribbean, is the primary cause of infection
among women, who are two to four times more
likely than men to become infected during
unprotected vaginal sex.4
Women’s biological vulnerability—due to 
a large surface area of reproductive tissue and
high virus concentrations in infected semen—is
compounded by economic and
social inequities. Women who
are economically dependent on
husbands or sexual partners have little control
over sexual relations and condom use. Social
taboos prevent women from learning about repro-
ductive health, while the stigma associated with
sexually transmitted infections is a barrier against
seeking care.5 Young women risk contracting
HIV from older partners, which explains large
differences in HIV prevalence between teenaged
males and females in many countries.6
In sub-Saharan Africa, home to 70 percent 
of the world’s HIV-positive people, AIDS is the
leading cause of death.7 In 2002, average life
expectancy in 16 African nations was at least 10
years lower than it would have been without
AIDS.8 HIV/AIDS is also exacerbating Africa’s
food crisis, threatening about 38 million people
with starvation.9 The epidemic has reduced the
number of agricultural workers and has unrav-
eled social safety nets as families sell off assets
to pay for medical or funeral expenses. For the
poor without access to antiretroviral therapies,
good nutrition is all that can ward off illness
and early death. When this is also lost,
weakened immune systems become susceptible
to tuberculosis, malaria, and other infections.10
Though Africa carries the greatest burden of
disease, the epidemic is growing fastest in East-
ern Europe and Central Asia, where it is linked
to intravenous drug use, high unemployment,
and crumbling public health facilities. In Rus-
sia, up to 90 percent of registered infections are
due to drug use.11 High rates of sexually trans-
mitted infections in the region indicate that het-
erosexual transmission could spread HIV into
the wider population, as seen in Ukraine and
Belarus.12 In the Baltic states, overcrowded pris-
ons and juvenile justice institutions serve as
breeding grounds for the virus.13
Another emerging AIDS hotspot is Asia,
where low national prevalence levels in popu-
lous nations mask the magnitude of localized
infection. Nearly 4 million people are infected
in India, and the epidemic has hit the general
population in several states.14 In China, people
in poor rural communities who participated in
blood-selling programs in the 1990s have
become concentrated pockets of HIV-positive
villagers with limited access to any kind of
care.15 In all, China reports an estimated 1 mil-
lion infections, with drug use and heterosexual
transmission continuing the spread.16
Although AIDS-related mortality has fallen
dramatically in high-income countries since
antiretroviral treatment became widespread 
in 1996, only 4 percent of those who need 
treatment in low- and middle-income countries
receive it.17 (See Figure 3.) The price of anti-
retrovirals has fallen dramatically, from
$10,000–12,000 a year per person in early 2000
to $350 by December 2001.18 The world’s poor-
est, however, cannot afford even this. 
Yet some progress has been made in making
access to treatment more equitable. In 2002,
Botswana became the first African nation to
adopt a policy of universal access to treatment.19
The biggest strides have been made in Latin
America and the Caribbean: Brazil, Argentina,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Uruguay, Honduras, and
Panama are among the countries providing free
or subsidized treatment.20
Even so, a huge gap persists between needed
and available resources. In 2002, $3 billion was
spent on efforts to stem the epidemic in low-
and middle-income countries.21 UNAIDS esti-
mates that funding will have to more than dou-
ble, to $6.5 billion, in 2003—with two thirds 
of the resources coming from international
sources.22
HIV/AIDS Pandemic Spreads Further Radhika Sarin
68 Vital Signs 2003
pp. 104, 108, 110
LIN
KS
Vital Signs 2003 69
HIV/AIDS Pandemic Spreads Further
Cumulative HIV Infections 
and AIDS Deaths Worldwide,
1980–2002
Year HIV Infections AIDS Deaths
(million)
1980 0.1 0.0
1981 0.3 0.0
1982 0.7 0.0
1983 1.2 0.0
1984 1.7 0.1
1985 2.4 0.2
1986 3.4 0.3
1987 4.5 0.5
1988 5.9 0.8
1989 7.8 1.2
1990 10.0 1.7
1991 12.8 2.4
1992 16.1 3.3
1993 20.1 4.7
1994 24.5 6.2
1995 29.8 8.2
1996 35.3 10.6
1997 40.9 13.2
1998 46.6 15.9
1999 52.6 18.8
2000 58.5 21.8
2001 62.9 24.8
2002 (prel) 67.9 27.9
Source: Joint United Nations Programmme
on HIV/AIDS.
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Figure 1: Estimates of Cumulative HIV Infections 
Worldwide, 1980–2002
Figure 2: Estimates of Cumulative AIDS Deaths 
Worldwide, 1980–2002
Figure 3: AIDS Deaths and Number of People Using
Antiretroviral Drugs, by Region, 2001
Global cigarette production fell to 5.6 trillion
pieces in 2002, a decrease of 0.5 percent over
2001.1 (See Figure 1.) While total production
has hovered around the same mark for the past
decade, population growth during this time has
reduced per capita output 13 percent since 1990,
to 897 cigarettes per person a year.2 (See Figure 2.)
China, the United States, and Russia—the
three largest producers—manufacture just
under half of the world’s supply. In 2002, China
produced 1.7 trillion cigarettes, 31 percent of
global production.3 The United
States manufactured 580 billion cig-
arettes, or 10 percent.4 But unlike
China, which uses 99 percent of the cigarettes it
produces, the United States exports 23 percent
of its output.5
Russia, traditionally a smaller producer, is
now the third largest, manufacturing 375
billion cigarettes in 2002, more than twice as
many as in 1998.6 And Russians are now lead-
ers in per capita cigarette consumption—smok-
ing 1,931 cigarettes in 2002, more than twice
the global average.7 (See Figure 3.)
Of the more than 1.1 billion smokers world-
wide, 82 percent live in low- or middle-income
countries.8 Between high population growth
and aggressive tobacco marketing campaigns in
these regions, most of the growth in smoking is
expected to occur in these nations—a develop-
ment that will increasingly burden public
health systems already straining from a lack of
resources and from diseases like AIDS.9
Currently, smoking kills 4.9 million people a
year—one in 10 adult deaths—from a range of
illnesses that includes heart disease, various
forms of cancer, and stroke.10 By 2030, experts
foresee smoking becoming the leading cause of
death, responsible for 10 million deaths a
year—of which 7 of every 10 would occur in
low- or middle-income countries.11
Globally, cigarettes and cigarette lights
(matches and lighters) also cause 17,000 fire
deaths and $27 billion of damage each year.12 In
the United States, cigarettes cost $76 billion a
year in health care expenditures and another $82
billion in lost productivity.13 Secondhand smoke
also threatens health, increasing the risk of lung
cancer and heart disease more than 20 percent.14
Since 1999, a coalition led by the World
Health Organization has been drafting a Frame-
work Convention on Tobacco Control to reduce
consumption through measures that include
stronger labeling requirements, marketing
restrictions, anti-smuggling laws, and
workplace bans.15 This global treaty will be
ready for signature in 2003, but its success is
uncertain, as the tobacco industry and several
governments have tried to weaken the text.16
Many regions have already significantly
reduced smoking by controlling tobacco. Ciga-
rette taxes lower smoking rates while providing
governments with funds to combat smoking-
related health problems.17 In the United King-
dom, as cigarette prices increased in real terms
by 70 percent over two decades, consumption
declined by more than 35 percent.18
Counter-advertising, such as anti-smoking
commercials and explicit health labels placed
on cigarette packs, also helps reduce smoking.19
In Canada, a 2001 survey showed that 90 per-
cent of smokers noticed the visually disturbing
labels and 44 percent were more motivated to
quit.20 Such efforts alone cannot combat the
huge marketing budgets of tobacco companies.
In the United States, the tobacco industry spent
$9.6 billion on advertising and promotion in
2000.21 Restrictions have little effect, as the
industry just shifts to new marketing mediums,
such as sponsoring sporting events.22 Compre-
hensive marketing bans are more successful,
however—decreasing smoking by up to 6.3 per-
cent over two decades.23 Currently, more than a
dozen countries have such bans.24
In 2002, Thailand banned smoking in
indoor public spaces, the strictest smoking ban
in Asia.25 Smoking bans have proved successful
in curbing smoking and reducing exposure to
secondhand smoke.26 A review of 26 studies
determined that totally smoke-free workplaces
cut the number of cigarettes consumed by 29
percent—the equivalent of raising cigarette
prices by 73 percent.27 Canada, since
implementing a comprehensive national anti-
tobacco strategy in 1999, has cut the national
smoking rate by 3 percent.28
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Cigarette Production Dips Slightly
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Figure 1: World Cigarette Production, 1950–2002
Figure 2: World Cigarette Production Per Person,
1950–2002
Figure 3: Cigarette Consumption Per Person in the
United States and China, 1960–2002, and in Russia,
1990–2002
World Cigarette Production,
1960–2002
Year Total Per Person
(billion) (number)
1950 1,686 660
1955 1,921 691
1960 2,150 707
1965 2,564 766
1970 3,112 839
1971 3,165 836
1972 3,295 853
1973 3,481 884
1974 3,590 894
1975 3,742 915
1976 3,852 926
1977 4,019 950
1978 4,072 946
1979 4,214 962
1980 4,388 985
1981 4,541 1,002
1982 4,550 987
1983 4,547 969
1984 4,689 983
1985 4,855 1,001
1986 4,987 1,011
1987 5,128 1,022
1988 5,240 1,027
1989 5,258 1,013
1990 5,419 1,027
1991 5,351 998
1992 5,363 985
1993 5,300 959
1994 5,478 977
1995 5,599 985
1996 5,680 985
1997 5,633 964
1998 5,581 942
1999 5,554 925
2000 5,609 923
2001 5,617 913
2002 (prel) 5,587 897
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture;
data for 1950–59 are estimates based on
USDA data.
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Violent Conflicts Continue to Decline
Peacekeeping Expenditures Down Slightly
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According to AKUF, a conflict research group at
the University of Hamburg, the number of wars
worldwide stood at 28 in 2002, down from 31
the previous year.1 In addition, there were 17
“armed conflicts” active in 2002 that were not
of sufficient severity to meet AKUF’s criteria for
war.2 Combining both categories, the total
number of violent clashes declined slightly—
from 48 in 2001 to 45.3 (See Figure 1.)
The overall number declined because the
number of conflicts ending—those in the Kur-
dish areas of eastern Turkey, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Guinea, Kosovo, Iran, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan—surpassed those newly erupt-
ing—in Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Congo-Braz-
zaville, and the Central African Republic.4
Meanwhile, the U.S.-led “war on terror,” ini-
tially focused on the Afghan Taliban regime,
more and more has the makings of an open-
ended campaign of worldwide scope. The Bush
administration’s words and actions made it
seem all but inevitable that an invasion of Iraq
would occur in 2003.5 Other countries, includ-
ing Russia, China, India, Indonesia, and Israel,
have also cited anti-terrorism as an excuse for
wars or acts of internal repression.6
The armed forces of countries on whose ter-
ritory fighting is taking place number in the
millions, but it is unclear how many of their
soldiers are actually engaged in combat. Non-
state armed groups worldwide have at least
some 350,000 fighters.7 Of these, about
140,000 were with groups that observed cease-
fires or were otherwise inactive in 2002.8 Some
300,000 children are among government or
opposition forces involved in fighting.9
Measuring whether the world is becoming
more or less violent is not an easy task.10 Infor-
mation is often incomplete or contradictory.
And definitional and methodological problems
confound efforts to establish unambiguous 
categories and thresholds to tally the number 
of armed conflicts. Findings from different
research groups, therefore, offer some variations
in their findings—reflecting a complex reality.
Figures compiled by researchers in Sweden and
Norway, for instance, show a substantial num-
ber of unclear cases.11 (See Figure 2.)
Researchers at the Heidelberg Institute for
International Conflict Research in Germany 
are assessing political conflict trends from a
broader perspective. The total number of con-
flicts has increased from 108 in 1992 to 173 in
2002.12 Of these, violent conflicts have recently
accounted for a fairly steady one-quarter
share.13 (See Figure 3.) The 17 conflicts that
escalated during 2002 were more than
outweighed by 31 de-escalated cases.14
The majority of conflicts are resolved by
nonviolent means, including negotiations and
other diplomatic efforts. In addition to various
peacekeeping efforts, negotiations were taking
place in 43 conflicts in 2002, resulting in three
peace treaties (in Chad, Moluccas, and Aceh)
and seven cease-fire agreements (which were
successful in Angola, Sri Lanka, and Somalia).15
U.N. arms embargoes and other sanctions were
maintained in eight cases.16
Researchers at PIOOM in the Netherlands
have made an even more extensive effort to
capture a broader multitude of conflicts, includ-
ing intercommunal conflicts not recorded 
elsewhere. PIOOM finds that there are more
than 300 “political tension situations”—hard-
to-monitor cases that typically either predate
violent conflict or follow it, possibly giving 
rise to renewed violence.17 These findings
underscore that today’s human rights violations,
inequalities, and environmental destruction
often end up as tomorrow’s wars.
The number of wars alone cannot of course
convey the severity of warfare in terms of
human suffering, political instability, or social,
economic, and environmental damage inflicted.
AKUF estimates that more than 7 million peo-
ple, most of them civilians, have died in the
course of the 45 wars and armed conflicts cur-
rently active.18 Cumulatively, these conflicts
have cost at least $250 billion—imposing a
heavy toll on countries that for the most part
are already desperately poor.19 And the cost of
reconstruction could be much higher.
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Violent Conflicts Continue to Decline
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Figure 3: Violent and Nonviolent Conflicts, 1992–2002
Figure 2: Wars, Intermediate and Minor Conflicts, and
Unclear Cases, 1950–2001
Figure 1: Wars and Armed Conflicts, 1950–2002
Wars and Armed Conflicts,
1950–2002
Wars and
Year Wars Armed Conflicts
(number)
1950 13
1955 15
1960 12
1965 28
1970 31
1971 31
1972 30
1973 30
1974 30
1975 36
1976 34
1977 36
1978 37
1979 38
1980 37
1981 38
1982 40
1983 40
1984 41
1985 41
1986 43
1987 44
1988 45
1989 43
1990 50
1991 54
1992 55
1993 48 65
1994 44 61
1995 34 49
1996 30 48
1997 29 47
1998 33 50
1999 35 49
2000 35 47
2001 31 48
2002 (prel) 28 45
Source: Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsur-
sachenforschung and the Institute for Political
Science at the University of Hamburg.
Expenditures for United Nations peacekeeping
operations from July 2002 to June 2003 are
expected to reach about $2.6 billion—slightly
less than in the previous reporting period.1 (See
Figure 1.) This contrasts with military expendi-
tures worldwide of $839 billion in 2001.2 Some
47,000 soldiers, military observers, and civilian
police served in peacekeeping missions during
2002, but the number dropped to
below 40,000 by the end of the
year.3 (See Figure 2.) In addition,
the missions were aided by 10,929 civilians.4
Two missions—in Bosnia and Croatia—ended
in December 2002.5
In addition to peacekeeping operations 
with strong military and police components,
the United Nations also maintained 13 small
“political and peace-building” missions during
2002, involving 1,073 mostly civilian staff.6
The largest of these is the U.N. Assistance Mis-
sion in Afghanistan set up in March 2002.7
The permanent members of the Security
Council have been reluctant to make significant
troop commitments to peacekeeping missions.
The leading contributors of personnel are Ban-
gladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, India, and Ghana,
together accounting for 43 percent of the total.8
By far the largest current operation, with
more than 16,000 peacekeepers, is in Sierra
Leone, where a gruesome civil war fueled by
diamond wealth has now wound down.9 In
December 2002, the Security Council decided 
to raise the authorized personnel strength of 
the mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo from 4,250 to 8,700.10 Following the
withdrawal of foreign armies, there is hope that
a December 2002 peace accord will end violence
among domestic combatants in eastern Congo.11
In four other locations, the United Nations
maintains missions that each deploy
3,000–5,500 peacekeepers.12 In addition to
Kosovo, the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, and south-
ern Lebanon, this includes the U.N. Mission in
Support of East Timor, a follow-on to the transi-
tional administration that facilitated East
Timor’s May 2002 independence.13
The Sierra Leone mission costs about $700
million a year, followed by the Congo operation
at $608 million.14 Expenditures for the Kosovo
and East Timor deployments run to more than
$300 million each, and the Ethiopia-Eritrea
observers cost more than $200 million.15
As of 31 December 2002, U.N. members 
still owed the organization $1.34 billion for
peacekeeping operations.16 The United States
accounted for 40 percent of unpaid dues, or
$536 million.17 The next-largest amounts 
were owed by Japan ($312 million), Italy ($41
million), China ($39 million), Spain ($32 
million), and Brazil ($28 million).18
A substantial number of peacekeeping mis-
sions are also being carried out by regional
organizations such as NATO, the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), and the Economic Community of
West African States, as well as by ad hoc coali-
tions of states.19 In recent years, there have
been 30–40 non-U.N. missions, involving a far
larger number of peacekeeping troops than the
United Nations deploys.20 (See Figure 3.)
Although information is incomplete, the com-
bined cost of these operations is likely in the
range of $8–12 billion a year.21
NATO-led deployments in the Balkans,
where more than 50,000 soldiers are patrolling
Kosovo and Bosnia, are by far the largest.22 The
OSCE maintains about a dozen small missions
in Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics,
involving about 1,500 people.23 A multi-
national observer force of roughly 1,900
soldiers has been deployed since 1982 in the
Sinai Peninsula.24 Russia keeps some 5,000
troops in Moldova and the Caucasus.25 And 
in Afghanistan, the International Security 
Assistance Force was created in December 2001
to ensure security in Kabul.26 It has about 4,800
soldiers from 28 countries.27 Governments have
shortsightedly rejected suggestions that this
force be extended beyond Kabul, even though
much of Afghanistan is again falling under the
sway of warlords and lawlessness.28
The personnel devoted to all forms of peace-
keeping—some 110,000 persons in 2002—is
dwarfed by the more than 400,000 soldiers
deployed abroad for traditional military purposes,
more than half of whom are U.S. troops.29
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Peacekeeping Expenditures Down Slightly
U.N. Peacekeeping
Expenditures, 1986–2002
Year Expenditure
(billion 2001 dollars)
1986 0.352
1987 0.339
1988 0.363
1989 0.834
1990 0.587
1991 0.598
1992 2.105
1993 3.559
1994 3.809
1995 3.752
1996* 1.456
1997* 1.063
1998* 1.060
1999* 1.721
2000* 2.692
2001* 2.770
2002* 2.609
* July to June of following year.
Source: U.N. Department of Public 
Information and U.N. Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations.
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Figure 3: Non-U.N. Peacekeeping Personnel, 1992–2002
Figure 2: U.N. Peacekeeping Personnel, 1950–2002
Figure 1: U.N. Peacekeeping Expenditures, 1950–2002
